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GRIEVING CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS
Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik*
Deborah Rhode has challenged the legal profession to reform itself,
and she has given us several blueprints for effecting systemic changes.
Her book, In the Interests of Justice,1 ably addresses complaints voiced
by clients, academics, the public at large, and by lawyers themselves
about the legal profession and the system of justice. We focus here on
one of the causes of disquiet about lawyers and justice-the bar's
complete abdication of its obligation to provide competent legal
services to indigent criminal defendants.
In this essay, our interest is the regulation of criminal defense
lawyers. Our goal is also more general-to bring attention to the
relationship between client markets and the regulation of attorneys.
While many have addressed how the availability of lawyers varies with
clients' capacity to pay, few have looked at how remedies for
incompetent or inadequate legal services also vary directly with the
financial wherewithal to pay lawyers. The many sources of regulation
of lawyers at the top of the legal hierarchy stands in sharp contrast to
those mechanisms that exist for lawyers who serve indigent criminal
defendants.
Regulating lawyers is a multi-faceted and complex enterprise.
Formally, every state requires members of its bar to adhere to a
system of codified ethical rules. Every state has a disciplinary system
that deals with complaints of rule violation. When reading Deborah
Rhode's book, however, one is always reminded of the backdrop: a
wide variety of lawyers are practicing today across a range of fields yet
are subject to an ethical code of (mostly) "one size fits all" rules. The
rules and their administration have yet to take into account the wide
divergence in the kinds of legal work that lawyers do.
Yet the rules are not the only source of constraint for subsets of
lawyers. When significant amounts of money are involved, more
forms of discipline are available to reduce, if not to prevent, unethical
and dishonest behavior by lawyers.2 Regulation of high-end lawyers
* Clinical Professor of Law, Yale Law School; Arthur Liman Professor of Law, Yale
Law School. All rights reserved. Our thanks to David Evans, Cori Van Noy and
Tanina Rostain for their thoughts on earlier drafts of this essay.
1. Deborah L. Rhode, In the Interests of Justice: Reforming the Legal Profession
(2000).
2. See generally David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 Harv. L
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has relatively little to do with the grievance procedures provided for
unhappy clients. Such lawyers are, of course, subject to whatever
rules of professional conduct have been adopted by the jurisdictions in
which those lawyers practice. But violations of these rules, and
problematic practices in general by these lawyers, are more often
dealt with by way of challenges directly from clients with resources
and sophistication and from constraints imposed by opponents and
judges. These third-party regulators rely on regimes of statutes and
rules, promulgated by legislatures and courts, and on norms
developed by cultures of lawyering (when sufficiently close and
dense).3
Clients are a source of oversight, particularly in areas within their
own knowledge, namely how much they have to pay for specific
services. Billing excesses are increasingly monitored by sophisticated
clients who have the information to shop for services by price, to
know what services law firms can provide and at what speed. Such
clients rely on in-house auditors to scan voluminous printouts to learn
where lawyers are padding bills or doing unnecessary work.
Courts also deal with advocacy abuses, albeit neither
comprehensively nor always effectively. Existing rules, both state and
federal, provide sanctions for attorney misbehavior, specifically for
impermissibly poor investigation of facts and misstatements of law in
pleadings as well as for abusive discovery The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are themselves increasingly laced with efforts to regulate
lawyers' behavior through management of case processing and by
directives on discovery practices.5 In aggregate litigation, judges often
do more, as they sometimes superintend fee awards and review
lawyers' delivery of services.6 Recently-proposed rules would go even
further-such as giving judges the power to select counsel in class
actions.7
Rev. 799 (1992).
3. For discussion of the role that norms play, see Tanina Rostain, Waking Up
from Uneasy Dreams: Professional Context, Discretionary Judgment, and the Practice
of Justice, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 955 (1999); Tanina Rostain, Ethics Lost: Limitations of
Current Approaches to Lawyer Regulation, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1273 (1998); Anthony
Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession (1993); Ronald J.
Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and Conflict
between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 509 (1994). Robert Gordon is less
optimistic about normative constraints. See Robert Gordon, The Ethical Worlds of
Large-Firm Litigators: Preliminary Observations, 67 Fordham. L. Rev. 709 (1998).
4. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 16, and 26.
5. See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 374 (1982) (explaining
the shift in judicial role towards oversight and the revision of federal rule regimes to
inspire judges to impose yet more control).
6. See Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Contingency Fees in Mass Torts: Access,
Risk, and the Provision of Legal Services When Layers of Lawyers Work for
Individuals and Collectives of Clients, 47 DePaul L. Rev. 425 (1998).
7. See, e.g., Committee on the Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial
Conference of the United States, Preliminary Draft of the Proposed Amendments to
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Legislatures provide another source of regulation, as statutes are
bases for challenges to frivolous filings. Atop these generalized rule
regimes come specialized rules from regulatory agencies such as the
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Office of Thrift
Supervision, which place additional responsibilities upon lawyers and
which offer mechanisms to monitor their behavior towards clients and
law.8
Court and legislative or administrative regimes do not often come
into play sua sponte. Rather, opponents (especially repeat players)
have a variety of incentives to enlist these mechanisms to advance
their own goals, thereby producing some monitoring of attorney
behavior and enforcement of practice norms. Opponents have
economic incentives to police attorneys when they can impose costs-
strategic as well as financial. For example, conflicts questions are
often posed through motions for disqualification brought for tactical
purposes in litigation. Further, based on the repeated nature of their
interactions, lawyers who see each other often (either in dealmaking
or in litigation) have reasons to be cooperative. The increasingly
mobile market of lawyers may also prompt lawyers to curb certain
forms of behavior to make them more employable-holding aside the
market for meanness.
All of these control mechanisms work imperfectly, with plenty of
opportunity for lawyers to behave unethically and to engage in
borderline practices. But whatever the shortcomings, when
substantial amounts of money are involved, the combination of
clients, adversaries, courts, and legislatures have provided some
means of redress, at least for flagrant abuses.
Skipping down now past the bulk of everyday law practice in
medium-sized and smaller firms, in cities large and small, we turn to
consider baseline criminal law practice involving public defenders,
assigned lawyers, and private lawyers at the low end of the earning
scale. Rhode describes vividly what goes on in this segment of
criminal practice.
Outside the courtroom, overburdened and under-prepared lawyers
strike hasty plea bargains for indigent clients with no realistic
alternatives. Missing are all the adversarial safeguards that, in other
contexts, the bar presents as essential to informed decision making.
The reason for this lapse in partisan protections is obvious. As a
federal oversight commission candidly noted, most criminal defense
the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy, Civil, and Criminal Procedure and the Rules of
Evidence, Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 23 (g) (Class Counsel) (Aug. 2001).
& See Dennis E. Curtis, Old Knights and New Champions: Kaye, Scholer, the
Office of Thrift Supervision, and the Pursuit of the Dollar, 66 S. Cal. L Rev. 985
(1993) (analyzing interpretations of lawyers' adversarial role by the Office of Thrift
Supervision).
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lawyers face an "inherent conflict between remaining financially
solvent and providing vigorous advocacy." 9
Return then to the packet of sources for lawyer regulation-
opponents, courts and legislatures, other regulatory agencies, and
individual clients. A subset of poor defendants are served by public
defender offices, sufficiently funded by the states or by the federal
government, well-run, and complete with in-house supervision and
training. But few of these offices are adequately funded, and some
are poorly-funded. Here, by setting rates too low and permitting
volume to be too high, legislatures and sometimes courts serve as
sources of the problems rather than occasional sources of regulatory
constraint on lawyers. Legislatures are notoriously unwilling to
appropriate money for criminal defense, and criminal defendants have
no powerful lobby at either the state or federal level. In this respect,
what funds that are available come through efforts by both bench and
bar, as periodically lawyers and judges valiantly co-venture in efforts
to obtain funding for counsel.10
For the two-thirds of felony defendants who are poor enough to
receive court-appointed counsel, prospects of finding a lawyer who
will provide zealous advocacy are chancy at best. Many defender
systems create perverse incentives that make zealous advocacy an
extravagance that (most) lawyers cannot afford. As Rhode points out,
some jurisdictions put out bids for handling cases for indigent criminal
defendants, so that a law firm or consortium of defense lawyers will
contract to handle all cases on a cost per case basis, or for a
guaranteed total amount." The low bidder who gets the contract will
have obvious incentives to spend the minimum of time and effort in
9. Rhode, supra note 1, at 61 (citation omitted).
10. The historical records of the federal judiciary in the National Archives provide
an impressive example of repeated efforts early in the century to improve criminal
defense through public support for lawyers. The culmination was the enactment of
the Criminal Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 88-455, 78 Stat. 552 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §
3006A (1994)). But the rates of compensation remain inadequate. See William H.
Rehnquist, 1999 Year-End Report of the Federal Judiciary (Jan. 1, 2000), available at
http:///www.uscourts.gov./ttb/janOOttb/2jan2OOO.html (discussing the ongoing efforts
and "major initiative" of the Judiciary to "increase the rates of pay for private 'panel'
attorneys accepting appointments under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA)"). As he
explained:
By statute, the Judiciary bears the responsibility for ensuring that defendants
who cannot afford counsel in federal criminal cases receive legal
representation. In 1986, Congress... set maximum hourly rates of up to
$75... [but] funding has not been made available for its nationwide
implementation, and in most judicial districts panel attorneys have been paid
only $65 for hours in court and $45 for out-of-court time. Inadequate
compensation for panel attorneys is seriously hampering the ability of courts
to recruit and to retain qualified panel attorneys to provide effective
representation.
Id.
11. Rhode, supra note 1, at 61.
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each case. High volume, low cost defense is a recipe for inadequacy.
As Rhode details, "[c]aseloads can range as high as 3500
misdemeanors and 900 felonies annually, and some attorneys haven't
taken a case to trial in years. 12
When courts assign private attorneys on a case-by-case basis, the
problems are parallel. Ceilings on total compensation per case and
low hourly rates mean that attorneys cannot spend adequate time on
cases and make any profit. Many of these lawyers are assigned high
volumes of cases. The suspicion arises that these lawyers are assigned
because they are adept at moving cases by persuading their clients to
plead guilty. Illustrative is a recent news article describing a lawyer
who had been assigned 1600 misdemeanor cases in a single year.13
Courts are not only a source of the problem but also bear
responsibility for the subsequent failures. Courts have repeatedly
refused to provide oversight of criminal defense attorneys despite the
fact that the relationships of these attorneys to clients are created
under the auspices of the courts. From the United States Supreme
Court on down, judges have declined to take responsibility for
ensuring that criminal defendants receive adequate representation.
Rhode uses the egregious "sleeping lawyer" cases to make this point.
Judges pore over trial records and take collateral testimony to
determine whether a given somnolent lawyer dozed, nodded, or slept,
and if so, whether the slumber took place at a crucial part of a
particular case. 4 Such outrages make plain the unduly low standard
for what passes as "assistance of counsel." The current standard
requires not only that the lawyer
made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the
"counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment ...
[but in addition] the defendant must show that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that
counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair
trial, a trial whose result is reliable. 5
In practice, apart from death penalty cases in which courts are
disposed to look somewhat more closely at claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel and other allegations of constitutional error,1 6
almost nothing short of proof of actual innocence will merit a reversal
of a conviction, however unfairly obtained. Dozing lawyers are an
12. Id.
13. Jane Fritsch & David Rohde, Legal Aid's Last Challenge From an Old
Adversary, Giuliani, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9,2001, at 41.
14. See Rhode, supra note 1, at 63. One such case was reversed recently by the
Fifth Circuit. See Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
15. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390-91 (2000) (quoting Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 664,687 (1994)).
16. See generally James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 Colum. L
Rev. 2030 (2000).
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extreme example of conduct that has been tolerated by courts. The
doctrine of harmless error as it applies to excuse criminal defense
failings has been expanded to such an extent that conduct by lawyers
has to be egregious to qualify for relief. Further, the availability of
collateral attacks has been limited through both Supreme Court
doctrine and congressional action, imposing time limits for filing
habeas actions and barring successive petitions. 7 Because trial
records do not often reveal what went on between counsel and
defendant, ineffective assistance claims are rarely brought on direct
appeal. Thus, limitations on habeas actions have particularly harsh
effects on the use of post-conviction processes to constrain real
miscarriages of justice caused by poor lawyering.
Individual clients, in turn, have little or no ability to monitor their
own lawyers, and their adversaries-prosecutors-have few incentives
to police the defense bar. Prosecutors who see incompetent and
unethical conduct by defense lawyers are reluctant to report such
conduct because disclosure might taint a conviction. 8 Here the
adversarial structure collapses. The prosecutor, post-conviction,
becomes protective of the defense counsel's performance. Other
lawyers who may observe unethical conduct may also be reluctant to
appear "'holier than thou' or to expose the profession's 'dirty linen' to
public scrutiny."' 9 On the other hand, as Rhode notes, the only state
(Illinois) that has attempted to enforce the rule requiring lawyers to
report ethical violations experienced a dramatic increase in reports
following a state supreme court decision suspending a lawyer for
failing to disclose unethical conduct by his client's former lawyer.20 In
other words, lawyer culture could be more of a source of constraint,
which brings us to the question of what role the bar could play in
generating a structure for criminal defense lawyers, their opponents,
judges, and clients to improve the quality of legal services for indigent
defendants.
The central obstacle to adequate representation of indigent criminal
defendants is, of course, lack of adequate funding. Poor training,
perverse incentives, and massive caseloads all stem from the lack of
resources devoted to criminal defense. More judges, reasonable fees,
and bar training programs would go a long way toward providing an
adequate defense function. However, commentators, including
Rhode, have been calling for allocation of more resources to indigent
17. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
132, 110 Stat. 1218 (codified in part at 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1999)).
18. See generally Vanessa Merton, What Do You Do When You Meet a "Walking
Violation of the Sixth Amendment" If You're Trying to Put That Lawyer's Client In
Jail, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 997 (2000).
19. Rhode, supra note 1, at 159.
20. Id. at 162-63.
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defense for years, and conditions have improved little, if at all, as
legislatures continue to ignore the problem.
But the bar, through its grievance procedures, could have some
impact on the system of indigent defense. In our view, state-wide
grievance procedures provide an under-utilized opportunity to
address systemic problems of criminal defense inadequacies (as well
as problems for less-well heeled civil clients). Grievance systems
provide a form of constraint on lawyers in addition to what is gained
through either malpractice or challenges based on ineffective
assistance of counsel. State disciplinary systems offer a window into
the daily work of lawyers, and they offer a relatively inexpensive form
of oversight. Further, unlike the civil side, in the criminal context the
question is no longer whether individuals have the right to legal
representation; that right is firmly established." At issue is the
adequacy of those services. Thus, the bar has an obligation not only
to help provide criminal defense services, the bar also has a
concomitant obligation to improve the quality of the services
provided. To that end, we propose expanding the use of state-based
disciplinary procedures against criminal defense lawyers who provide
inadequate services.
Our understanding of the potential utility stems from the work that
one of us (Dennis Curtis) has for the past three years done in
conjunction with the creation of a clinical course in which students
provide representation to persons who file complaints about their
lawyers with Connecticut's Statewide Grievance Committee. That
experience has led us to see the plausibility of grievance procedures as
a process that could, with attention and alteration, come to fill at least
a part of the gap between ethical obligation and current practices.
Connecticut's grievance system is mostly peopled by volunteer
lawyers and lay persons, and unlike many state systems, does not have
prosecutors to carry forward the charges that lawyers have violated
the state's code of professional conduct. When individuals file
complaints against lawyers, the complaints are sent to the office of the
Statewide Bar Counsel and its staff, all state employees. 2 If the
charges are seen to have facial merit, the complaint is sent to local
panels within each judicial district, composed of volunteers, assisted
by salaried counsel for each panel. If a panel finds probable cause, the
case is forwarded for a hearing before a grievance panel comprised of
21. A few of the current justices propose, however, a cutback on equipage
provided to criminal defendants. See M.L.B. v. S.LJ., 519 U.S. 102, 129-44 (1996)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (urging a retreat from decisions mandating transcripts on
appeal for indigent criminal defendants and for those charged with misdemeanors
resulting in fines).
22. Connecticut General Statutes §§ 51-84 to 51-94 and the parallel rules in the
Connecticut Practice Book (§§ 2-29 to 2-65) (Revision of 1998) provide the authority
and the framework for Statewide Grievance Committee rules and procedures.
1621
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three members from the Statewide Grievance Committee. Grievance
panels are made up of two lawyers and one nonlawyer. They can
make findings of disciplinary violations based on evidence of lawyer
fault sustained by clear and convincing evidence. Grievance panels
are empowered to administer warnings and reprimands, but they
cannot impose suspension or disbarment. If a grievance panel finds
that a violation deserves more than a reprimand, the committee will
forward the case to a judge of the Superior Court for "presentment."
In these cases, lawyers from the Bar Counsel's staff act as prosecutors,
and suspensions from practice or disbarments may follow.23
In Yale's clinical program, which seeks to augment the capacity of
clients in Connecticut to grieve, the Bar Counsel's office provides all
of the probable cause findings from the various local panels to the
clinic's supervising attorneys, thereby enabling us to see many
complaints from civil litigants and a smaller number from criminal
defendants. 4 Typical complaints on the criminal side allege that the
defense lawyer would not answer telephone calls, did not interview
witnesses, did not inform the defendant about the progress of the case,
and at the last minute told the defendant that a deal had been
arranged and to appear in court within a day or two to plead guilty.
The civil analog alleges that a lawyer accepted a fee, failed to inform
the client of the progress of the suit, failed to explain the matter
sufficiently to permit the client to make an informed decision, did not
perform the required work, and either allowed the case to languish or
failed to prevent a default judgment.
At present, the data available are not sufficient to learn the
frequency with which complaints against criminal defense lawyers are
either filed or result in disciplinary action. In the set reviewed thus
far, local grievance panels have made a few findings of probable cause
involving criminal defense lawyers, some appointed and others from
the state's public defender offices. What we have seen prompts us to
suggest expanding the use of the disciplinary processes to improve the
quality of representation of criminal defendants.
Rhode is dubious that disciplinary authorities will act to curb
inadequate representation of indigent defendants or of those
23. See Connecticut Practice Book § 2-47.
24. Letters, drafted in compliance with Connecticut's rather strict rules about
solicitation of cases, are sent to some of the complainants inquiring whether they
would like to be represented by law students, supervised by faculty, at their hearings.
Because Connecticut does not provide clients with representation, we then serve as
volunteers to provide representation in those cases in which probable cause has been
found. We organize the presentation of evidence, prepare for direct and cross
examination, prepare prehearing memoranda and post-hearing briefs when
necessary-all tasks that most complainants have no experience with. We also make
arguments to the panels about the legal issues raised by ethics rules. Thus, we both
help to streamline cases and to present a comprehensive perspective.
1622 [Vol. 70
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defendants just over the poverty line who cannot afford zealous
advocacy. In her words,
In theory, inadequate representation could trigger malpractice
remedies. In fact, such remedies are almost never forthcoming,
because convicted criminals are unsympathetic plaintiffs and
prevailing doctrine denies recovery unless they can overturn their
conviction or prove their innocence. Bar disciplinary authorities do
not impose sanctions for "mere" negligence against criminal defense
attorneys. And only in the most egregious cases will courts reverse
convictions for ineffective assistance of counsel. 5
Rhode is demonstrably correct that malpractice and ineffective
assistance claims depend upon a showing of injury-either of
innocence or that a conviction or sentence was illegally obtained. The
question is whether the disciplinary system can operate in a space
between negligence, malpractice, or (legally defined) ineffective
assistance and breach of a lawyer's duty under rules of professional
ethics.
The contribution to be made here is to generate such a space, to
expand on the concept that ethical violations need not be equated
with either malpractice or-by extension-ineffective assistance of
counsel. This premise is constitutive of many state grievance
processes. For example, Connecticut's Rules of Professional Conduct
specifies that violations of disciplinary rules are not to be taken as
evidence that malpractice has occurred.26 The opposite side of this
coin, we can assume, is that violations short of malpractice or
ineffective assistance are worthy of sanctions when the evidence is
there. On the civil side, at least in Connecticut, sanctions are often
imposed when actual malpractice has not been charged or proven.
And whatever the distance is on the civil side between malpractice
and sanctionable failings by lawyers, on the criminal side the chasm is
enormous.
Departing from Rhode's assessment,2 7 and focusing on the array of
sanctions that disciplinary processes impose, we think that use of the
grievance system has potential. Appearing before a grievance panel is
25. Rhode, supra note 1, at 62.
26. Connecticut's Rules of Professional Conduct contain six sections- Preface,
Preamble, Scope, Terminology, Rules and Commentary, and Code of Judicial
Conduct. See Connecticut Practice Book. The first four sections are individually set
forth. Commentary for each Rule follows the Rule. Under "Scope" appears the
following:
Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of action nor should it
create any presumption that a legal duty has been breached. The Rules are
designed to provide.., a structure for regulating conduct through
disciplinary agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil liability.
Connecticut Practice Book 3.
27. Rhode, supra note 1, at 160 ("Rarely do disciplinary committees or courts that
review committee findings want to withdraw attorneys' means of livelihood or to
antagonize the local bar.").
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a daunting experience for lawyers. Reactions vary from resentful,
aggrieved protestations of innocence to abject confessions and
apologies, with everything in between. Responding to a finding of
probable cause that one has engaged in unethical conduct plainly
prompts some lawyers to reflect, and sometimes, to change. The
activity of seeking sanctions can help to generate a culture in which
criminal defense is taken as a serious sector of the practice of law, in
which norms of good conduct are developed, and in which groups of
lawyers and lay persons come to understand more of the failings of
contemporary criminal defense. Using the disciplinary system could
be responsive to the challenges faced by those lawyers described by
Rhode who do not willingly or consciously compromise their clients'
interests, but are "caught within a structure that fails to provide the
necessary resources, standards, or oversight to ensure effective
representation."'  If, as we hope, disciplinary systems come into the
picture in a sustained fashion, those lawyers might come to see their
work as a valued aspect of legal practice-worthy of scrutiny by other
lawyers not involved in criminal law practice and by lay overseers.
To alter institutional norms and practices would require the filing of
numerous complaints, followed by investigations and decisions. For a
lawyer disciplinary system to have impact on the quality of criminal
defense services, one would have to encourage clients and judges to
bring grievances, as well as to persuade disciplinary committees to
take on this admittedly difficult and unpopular task and to do so
repeatedly. Although disappointed criminal defendants are often
dissatisfied with their lawyers, in Connecticut at least, they rarely file
state ethics grievances but more often pursue claims in court aimed at
overturning their convictions or shortening prison or supervisory time.
A few of the grievances that do get filed appear aimed at eliciting
testimony or other evidence that would be helpful in collateral
proceedings.
One question is what might prompt criminal defendants to protest
low quality legal services when such protests do not result in either
shortened time or monetary relief. As to motivation, a good deal of
social science literature on litigants, including criminal defendants,
indicates that people value process as well as outcome. 9 As to
28. Id. at 63.
29. A study in the 1980s directly addressed the concerns of felony defendants and
concluded that their evaluations of their treatment did not depend solely on outcome;
rather, "their sense of fairness-in terms of both procedural and distributive justice -
appears to have substantially influenced their evaluations." See Jonathan D. Casper,
Tom Tyler & Bonnie Fisher, Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22 Law & Soc'y Rev.
483, 503 (1988). See generally Paul G. Chevigny, Fairness and Participation, 64
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1211 (1989) (reviewing E. Allen Lind & Tom R. Tyler, The Social
Psychology of Procedural Justice (1988)); see also John Jackson, Rosemary Kilpatrick
& Clare Harvey, Called to Court: A Public Review of Criminal Justice in Northern
Ireland, 138-42 (1991) (describing a small sample of criminal defendants, as well as
1624 [Vol. 70
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knowledge, many defendants are (unfortunately) repeat players,
experienced in the criminal justice system, with some sophistication as
to the legal requirements, and with clear expectations. -' Further, we
know first hand that prisoners value being treated as persons
deserving of respect. Therefore, we believe that some defendants
would welcome an opportunity to bring complaints of unjust or
insufficient delivery of legal services.
A second question concerns the flip side: would defendants bring
too many grievances? Currently, the popular view of prisoners is that
they complain too much. Congress has codified many new obstacles
to prisoner litigation on that premise." Our view, in contrast, is that
defendants with genuine grievances against lawyers often do not use
an avenue that we would like to make more accessible. Given that the
remedies in a state grievance system do not flow directly to
complainants, we are prepared to turn to this route without undue
worry of its overuse. Moreover, in light of some survey data on
criminal defendants and the filing rates of prisoners seeking habeas
corpus relief, we believe a majority would not seek relief either
because, like other potential grievants, they would (in the language of
the anthropology of dispute resolution) "lump it," or because a
significant proportion would conclude that their lawyers did a
reasonable job.3"
Assuming as we do that a small subset of defendants would, if given
an opportunity, record their concerns, education would also be
needed about how to access a grievance system and about what counts
as a problem within its parameters. We turn then to who within the
jurors, and witnesses, and finding defendants who cared about treatment as well as
outcomes).
30. In addition to the studies about criminal defendants' concerns about process,
cited supra note 29, a survey of criminal justice participants in England, including a
small number of defendants, supports the view that defendants have knowledge
sufficient to be useful sources of information about proper attorney behavior. See
Michael Zander & Paul Henderson, The Royal Commission on Criminal Justice:
Crown Court Study xv, 262 (1993) (noting that while the response rate was low, the
results to questionnaires from 793 defendants were sufficiently representative as to be
reported). That study also suggests the utility of a comparable research project in the
United States to thicken the understanding of how services are delivered and to
clarify the marginal utility of greater or lesser fees and/or supervision on the quality of
representation. For example, the Zander and Henderson study asked details of the
timing of meetings between defendants and lawyers in terms of when meetings
occurred in relationship to hearings, the length of the interviews, and turnover of
lawyers. Id. at 62-67.
31. See Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-40, 110 Stat. 1327
(codified in various parts of the U.S. Code, including 18 U.S.C. § 3626).
32. See Zander & Henderson, supra note 30, at 67 (reporting that, defendants
were on the whole "very positive about what had been done for them by the lawyers,"
referring to the barristers). They found a relatively high satisfaction rate with
solicitors as well. Id. at 68-69. Satisfaction rates did vary with outcome, with ninety-
two percent of those acquitted and sixty-nine percent of those convicted describing a
solicitor's work was either "very good" or "good." Id. at 69.
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system could be the source of education for litigants. Judges already
have that role; they routinely inform criminal defendants of rights to
have counsel and to stand trial. Judges could likewise inform them of
rights to protest poorly-prepared counsel and guide them on what
degree of discontent would suffice as grounds. Were judges to take on
the task, they might also serve to shape expectations of what
minimally adequate services entail. A kind of "best practices" list
could be developed to focus both counsel and defendant on what
"assistance of counsel" requires. Further, through such explanation,
judges would enact one of law's goals-to treat individual defendants
with dignity.
While we are confident that judges could readily articulate
minimum acceptable practices, we think it unwise to assume that
judges also know the ins and outs of a grievance system. Given the
low visibility of attorney grievance systems, many practicing lawyers
and judges-aside from those charged and those administering the
system-have no contact with and no reason to become familiar with
the details of how to grieve. Therefore, in addition to teaching
defendants, judges would also need to be educated on the availability
of a complaint process. As to judges' incentives, the difference
between the standard for undoing a conviction and the many failures
of lawyering short of ineffective assistance should provide comfort.
Judges could turn to discipline as a means of improving the quality of
practice without necessarily fearing that convictions would be
overturned. Asking judges to reflect on the quality of legal services
and providing a means by which to express concern could help to raise
expectations about the kind of services that ought to be provided.
Were better lawyering to become a standard artifact of criminal
proceedings, judges in turn might find the assignment to that segment
of the docket less arduous.
For judges as well as clients to consider using grievance processes
requires that disciplinary committees, in turn, be willing to find
violations and to punish lawyers, including those who work under
admittedly difficult conditions. The reluctance to look too closely
when violations exist stems from an unwillingness of many in the bar
to do such work themselves. Entailed would be a shift in the bar's
posture, from quiet acceptance of often inadequate lawyering to
shouldering its burden of monitoring the supply of adequate criminal
defense counsel. An incentive comes from lawyers' shared stake in
reputation and in control of their own profession. Criminal justice
horror stories are regularly features of the press. Sleeping lawyers are
a ready source of jokes about lawyers, and popular culture is unlikely
to draw fine distinctions between the kinds of practices that generate
the examples of lawyer misconduct.
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Moreover, as Rhode observes, "[1]awyers retain far more control
over their own oversight than any other occupation. '33 Despite her
justified concern that "[s]uch freedom from external accountability
too often serves the profession at the expense of the public,"' the bar
has assumed and fought for the responsibility to protect the public
from unethical practices by lawyers. And in the current criminal
justice system, the bar stands almost alone as a constraint on unethical
practices by criminal defense lawyers. The bar may argue that it has
little, if any, duty to provide civil legal services to all that need them,
because such shortcomings reflect general societal problems. That
argument does not work in the criminal defense context. Lawyers are
required for a large portion of criminal cases; states create public
defender systems and pay for them, whether adequately or not.
Lawyers staff these systems. Given the bar's jurisdiction over the
sanctioning process for unethical conduct and its interest in preserving
that jurisdiction, it ought not duck its duty to criminal defendants and
to the public.
The grievance process could serve at least three functions. First, by
taking complaints against criminal defense lawyers seriously,
grievance committees can pass judgment on some lawyers in some
cases. Second, more of the stories of ordinary malfeasance could
become part of general knowledge. Bar grievance committees are
required to provide reports to courts and to the public. At present in
Connecticut, data about disciplinary proceedings is presented in
summary fashion, generally consisting of numbers of complaints filed,
dismissals, findings of probable cause, presentments to Superior
Court, and sanctions. Disciplinary reports would be much more
useful were they to include both data and narratives about the
instances in which lawyer conduct falls below the standard demanded
by the ethical rules. If these reports were more informative about the
kinds of violations and the resulting sanctions, especially in the
criminal defense area, the bar would have a sense of the kinds of
inadequacies that occur. This knowledge might motivate lawyers to
take concerted action in remediation, including lobbying for increased
funding of public defender services, implementation of training
programs for criminal defense lawyers, and organizing volunteer
programs to provide direct representation to clients or assistance to
those who come into the grievance process based on experiences with
either civil or criminal attorneys. Third, and returning to our point at
the outset of the "one size fits all" ethical rules, as the grievance
committees obtain a greater understanding of the particular
challenges of criminal defense work, they may also reflect on the
33. Rhode, supra note 1, at 143.
34. Id. (footnote omitted).
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desirability of generating rules more specific to the context of criminal
defense rather than relying on transubstantive rules of ethics.
Given the bleak landscape of criminal defense, we are in no way
starry-eyed. But it is the very bleak and grievously impoverished
landscape that prompts us to look for alternatives, and thus to believe
that state-based grievance processes are surely worth a try. The
disciplinary system offers not only another option in a world that
seems to have too few but also something else: it provides concrete
examples to the bar of specific instances of unsatisfactory practice by a
diverse set of lawyers at the less profitable end of legal practices.
From such sources could come new insights into the problems that
would in turn prompt refinement of rules and norms. Poor provision
of criminal defense services is a grievous injury not only for clients but
for the legal profession and the public. Public grievance processes are
one way to mark the fact of such injury and to begin to piece together
responses.
